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 DEFINING THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: AN 
EXPLORATORY STUDY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper advances the resource dependence and social networks literature by investigating 
a board’s structural social capital created as a consequence of interlocking directorates.  
Using approaches and measures developed by social network analysis we compare the 
interpersonal directorship networks of the top 250 companies in the United States and 
Australia.  We find that the smaller, sparser Australian network is only marginally less 
compact and connected than the larger US network at the firm level of analysis.  However, at 
the director level of analysis the US network is much larger and more connected than its 
Australian counterpart.  As a result, we argue that scholars studying the resource dependence 
role of boards should consider using measures of interpersonal links as well as traditional 
measures of inter-firm links.  
 
 Understanding how boards impact on corporate performance is a question central to the 
corporate governance research agenda. Agency theory, for example, argues that the key way 
a board adds value is by ensuring the interests of the managers of the firm are aligned with 
the interests of the owners (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling 1976). A quite distinct area 
of inquiry, however, relates to the role that the board plays in providing access to important 
resources such as customers (Pennings 1980), capital (Mizruchi & Stearns 1988), the 
business elite (Useem 1984) and power in general (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). 
 
We aim to broaden understanding of the resource dependence theory of corporate governance 
by examining the links provided to a board by interlocking directorships.  We commence by 
reviewing existing research on the resource dependence role of the board before outlining 
how the emerging construct of social capital can be adapted and applied to investigate this 
role.  In particular, we highlight how it is the personal director network that is critical to the 
development of social capital rather than the corporate network (i.e. network of corporations).   
 
While this study is primarily exploratory and descriptive, we contribute to the literature by 
employing a new methodology to measure the ‘opportunity network’ that interlocking 
directorates provide a board within a national corporate governance system (Adams 2002a; 
2002b; 2002c).  We show how the formal models, procedures and techniques developed in 
social network analysis can be applied to individual-level networks among directors.  We 
stress that we are not considering the formation of social capital at the individual level; rather 
we are examining the systemic connections of individual directors in order to illustrate the 
opportunity network available to a board within the national corporate governance system.  A 
comparison of the Australian and US systems highlights the divergence in network attributes 
 between corporate networks and the networks of interlocking directors.  We conclude with 
implications and areas for further research. 
 
Boards and Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Resource dependence theory posits a firm’s success will be contingent on its ability to gain 
access and control over external resources (Aldrich 1979; Aldrich & Pfeffer 1976).  
Proponents argue that control of the external environment is a key determinant of firm 
performance (Katz & Kahn 1978; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000) and so firms seek to 
control market conditions (such as competition, social forces and regulation) or access critical 
resources (Boyd 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).  This idea has been extensively investigated 
in a variety of contexts including differing organisation types, (Zald 1967; Provan 1980; 
Pfeffer & Nowak 1976; Boyd 1990) and difficult methods of cooptation, (Pfeffer 1972a; Burt 
1980a; Pfeffer & Nowak 1976; Pfeffer & Leblebici 1973; Galaskiewicz 1979). 
 
Director Interlocks: Definitions and Correlates 
 
Interlocking directors have been long-acknowledged as one method of controlling the 
external environment and accessing resources (Means 1939).1  Director interlocks occur 
between two organisations where a director on a focus firm sits on the board of a different 
firm (Boyd 1990).  Thus, identification of interlocks is straightforward and the method used 
is common to nearly all studies in the area (Zajac 1988).2  As Burt (1980b, p. 564-565) sets 
out, ‘… a connection between two separate firms can still provide more of an “inside” 
connection between their establishments than would be the case on the open market’.  In 
 summary, interlocking boards are generally considered to be ‘vehicles for coopting important 
external organizations’ (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p. 167).   
 
Since interlocks are hypothesised to control the external environment they would most likely 
depend on certain external contingencies.  Interlocks appear particularly relevant to firms 
facing three conditions: (1) uncertainty and interdependence, (2) organisational complexity, 
and (3) dispersed ownership.  Uncertainty due to competition has been correlated with 
frequency of interlock (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), the proportion of outside directors is 
positively related to level of environmental demand (Pfeffer 1972b) and there is further 
evidence that, as uncertainty increases, the composition of the board will change as measured 
by number of directors or proportion of external directors (Gales & Kesner 1994; Hillman, 
Cannella & Paetzold 2000; Pennings 1980).   
 
Most studies of the complexity-interlock relationship generally use a proxy of firm size as the 
measure of complexity.  This is a reflection of the ubiquitous relationship between firm size 
and the number of interlocks (e.g. Allen 1974; Burt 1980b; Dooley 1969, p. 316; Pfeffer 
1972b; Warner & Unwalla 1967) that is thought to be brought about by the need for more 
directors to legitimate and coordinate the firm in its external activities (Allen 1974; Pfeffer 
1972b).  Burt (1980b, p. 578) concluded in his study of manufacturing firms, that as the 
company grows, it seeks to establish links with other manufacturing firms (i.e. similar 
organisations) in order to ‘eliminate competition with a firm’s own establishments’. 
 
Finally, dispersion of ownership is correlated with increased interlocking.  This is generally 
considered to be an attempt by the organisation to engage external constituents through 
interlocks.  Thus, percentage of executive directors (used as proxy for concentration of 
 management control) is negatively correlated with interlocks (Dooley 1969; Pfeffer 1972b) 
and family-controlled companies are negatively correlated with interlocks (Allen 1976; Burt 
1980b).3  Additionally, management controlled and family owned firms have decreased 
network range and multiplicity (Burt 1980b). 
 
Board Interlocks and Firm Performance 
 
Resource dependence theory requires the researcher to differentiate between mere 
correlations of interlocks and the effects of interlocks on firm performance.  The first major 
study of boards as a cooptation device was carried out by Selznick (1949), who noted the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) sought to neutralise strong opposition by bringing 
representatives of the hostile groups onto the TVA’s governing board.  Similarly, Price 
(1963) and Zald (1967) also documented the use of boards as a cooptative device. 
 
Recently, scholars have examined direct links between various measures of firm performance 
and interlocking behaviour.  Boyd (1990) found that, in firms facing greater environmental 
uncertainty, those with more interlocks (and smaller boards) exhibited superior performance 
as measured by sales growth and return on equity.4  Similarly, there is evidence of a negative 
relationship between firm profitability and the probability of replacing broken ties5 in five 
years time (Richardson 1987).   
 
Boards are thought to use their links to add value in three ways.6  First, they can act as a 
cooptive mechanism to extract resources (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and obtain support from 
external stakeholders critical to the organization’s performance.  Second, board members 
serve as boundary spanners (Zahra & Pearce 1989) providing channels for communication 
 information with the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).  Third, boards are 
thought to play an important role in enhancing organisational legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978; Zahra & Pearce 1989).   
 
While a director’s ties will be important to all these activities, it is likely that personal bonds 
will be more important in some cases than others.7  For instance, effective resolution of many 
resource dependency issues require formal company linkages (such as providing access to 
capital, reducing transaction costs between companies, addressing firm level 
interdependencies).  In other cases, however, individual directors may provide advantage to 
the firm on a personal level (e.g. environment scanning, provision of information or access to 
communication channels). 
 
In terms of formal company linkages, many studies have concentrated on providing access to 
capital (e.g. Mizruchi & Stearns 1994; Stearns & Mizruchi 1993; Thompson & McEwen 
1958).  Overall, there appears to be a positive relationship between interlocks and firm 
solvency and performance (see Dooley 1969; Pfeffer 1971b; Pennings 1980; Stockman, 
Zieglan & Scott 1985; Mizruchi & Stearns 1988). 
 
As boundary spanners, directors can increase coordination across firms and reduce 
transaction costs (Williamson 1984).  For instance, interlocking directors can form a formal 
firm link aimed at reducing the costs of coordination and resource planning (Bazerman & 
Schoorman 1983).  Boundary spanning can also play a role on a more personal director level, 
with individual directors providing the focus firm with access to information (Allen 1974; 
Bazerman & Schoorman 1983; Burt 1979; Zahra & Pearce 1989).  For instance, Hillman, 
Zardkoohi and Bierman (1999) found that firms with links to the US government had reduced 
 uncertainty due to information flows resulting in greater shareholder value.  Similarly, 
directors with ties to strategically related firms have been found to provide better advice and 
counsel, which is positively related to firm performance (Westphal 1999).   
 
Interlocking directors can also aid in the dissemination of organisational innovation through a 
corporate network (Haunschild & Beckman 1998).  Firms are more likely to adopt a 
multidivisional structure if they have with ties with previous adopters (Palmer, Jennings & 
Zhou 1989), and firms adopt poison pill defences quicker if they are tied to previous adopters 
(Davis 1991). 
 
Finally, there is a long established tradition that sees interlocking directors use personal 
reputation to increase legitimacy (Daily & Schwenk 1996; Gales & Kesner 1994; Hambrick 
& D’Aveni 1992; Selznick 1949).  An organisation’s reputation depends on the board of 
directors (Bazerman & Schoorman 1983), so that ‘prestigious or legitimate persons or 
organizations represented on the focal organization’s board provide confirmation to the rest 
of the world of the value and worth of the organization’ (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p. 145). 
For instance, firms with more prestigious boards have been linked with less underpricing at 
an IPO (Certo 2003; Certo, Daily & Dalton 2001). 
 
Interlocks: Some Criticisms and a Path Forward 
 
Despite the evidence of relationships between interlocks and corporate performance, the role 
of the board as a cooptive mechanism is not without criticism (e.g. Donaldson 1995).  In 
particular, it is argued that boards undertaking an interorganisational cooptation role would 
most likely breach legal duties in most Western countries and transgress society’s views on 
 fair play (Burt 1983).  Further, since directorships are a matter of public record, directors 
would be carrying out co-optation in a highly public way and threatening the underlying 
legitimacy of their organisations (Donaldson 1995).   
 
But the most telling criticism lies in understanding how the interlock works. Studies of 
interlocking boards presume that ‘when an organization appoints an individual to a board, it 
expects the individual will come to support the organization, will concern himself with its 
problems, will favourably present it to others, and will try to aid it’ (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, 
p. 163).  However, resource dependence theory is based on a reciprocity model (Boyd 1990) 
whereby the actions of one company place an obligation on another, rather than as an 
asymmetric relationship envisaged by some authors (e.g. see Donaldson’s (1995) criticism of 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)).  These criticisms highlight that we need to understand 
interlocks as they relate to the individual director if we are to imply reasons for the linkage. 
 
Social Capital 
 
Most studies of the board’s resource dependence role have concentrated on linkages between 
firms.  We are seeking instead to follow Burt (1980, p. 557) and study the ‘network relations 
involving a specific firm’, particularly the networks of individuals, since it is individuals who 
provide access to resources, span boundaries and legitimise the firm.  This approach 
recognises that mobilising resources depends on relationships between individual directors 
rather than linkages between corporations.  Our aim in this paper is to better understand 
‘exactly who is linked with whom?’ (Zajac 1988, p. 429) so as examine social capital as it 
applies to boards of directors.  
 
 Social capital relates to the elements of social structure that form a resource for action (Burt 
1992; Coleman 1990).  It is a construct attracting a broad range of scholars seeking to explain 
how actors mobilise resources through relationships (Adler & Kwon 2002).  Unlike other 
forms of capital, it is jointly owned by the parties in the relationship and cannot be 
appropriated by an individual (Burt 1992) – thus, the relationship reflects the reciprocity 
assumption underlying the resource dependence element of interlocking directorships (Boyd 
1990). 
 
Since we are concerned with social capital in corporations, we adapt Gabbay and Leenders 
(1999, p. 3) to provide the following definition:   
 
Social capital is the implicit and tangible set of resources available, by virtue of individual 
relationships, to assist a corporate player in goal attainment. 
 
This definition matches the role of directors in providing access to resources.  First, as in 
resource dependence theory, it requires resources that the corporate actor (or firm) requires.  
Second, these resources are made available through individual relationships (i.e. the 
interlocks between directors).  Third, it requires the resources to be necessary for the 
attainment of corporate goals. 
 
Since social capital is a multidimensional construct, it allows the researcher to recognise the 
necessity of both the actual linkages and the nature of those linkages.  A widely applied 
dimensionality is that of Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) who argue that there are three 
dimensions of social capital: structural, relational and cognitive social capital.  Structural 
social capital describes the actual bonds or links between actors (i.e. whether they know one 
another).  Relational social capital is the nature of these links (e.g. trust, mistrust, etc.).  
 Finally, cognitive social capital is the level of shared mental schema of the two linked actors.  
This conceptualisation recognises that both the tie and the nature of that tie are important 
(e.g. Burt 1992; Scott 2000).   
 
Our study is conceptually important for two reasons.  First, it differs substantially from the 
majority of resource dependence/interlock studies because it uses a new methodology that 
investigates the links between individuals as the basis for analysis rather than the links 
between companies.  The multidimensional nature of social capital, however, means there 
will be difficulty in representing it with any single variable.  In our case, we concentrate on 
measuring structural social capital (i.e. interlocks).  We acknowledge the presence of 
structural social capital (i.e. a bond) does not necessarily result in relational or cognitive 
social capital (i.e. a positive bond) but nevertheless believe the technique is a methodological 
advance over current firm-level measures.  These basic contacts are a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition to develop a board’s social capital (Emerson 1972; Miles & Snow 1993).  
 
Second, we use these ties to explore the network of opportunities (i.e. the potential resources) 
available to corporations rather than just the resources linked directly between the 
interlocking boards.  Most studies of network opportunity concentrate solely on the resources 
available through a direct interlock.  While this is a conservative approach, we argue that ties 
open up opportunities beyond those provide by directly interlocking directors.  For instance, 
if I request information on a topic from a friend, most director interlock studies concentrate 
on the opportunity afforded by the link to my friend.  This is because there is clear structural 
social capital (i.e. the link), and a presumed relational social capital (i.e. positive bond).  
However, in reality my friend will often introduce to me to a third party (i.e. my friend’s 
friend), who may be able to assist.  In this case, my opportunity network includes my friend’s 
 friends, even though I do not have an interlock (structural social capital) when I first seek the 
resource.  Thus, our approach employs the concept of ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973).  In 
essence, we argue that there is a transfer of relational social capital (positive bond) at the 
second level of contact because we both have a positive bond with my friend (i.e. there is 
potential social capital that will crystallise on the formation of the structural tie).  We do not 
believe, however, that this relational social capital will extend indefinitely.  While it is 
arguable that cognitive social capital (shared language, frames of reference, etc.) extends 
beyond the second tie (e.g. Granovetter), our conceptualisation of the opportunity network is 
based on the need for relational social capital (e.g. a positive bond) and so will not transfer 
beyond a third degree of separation (a friend of my friend’s friend). 
 
In summary, we aim to broaden the application of resource dependence theory to corporate 
governance by examining the personal links provided to a board by interlocking 
directorships.  Our approach parallels that of traditional board interlock studies, but goes one 
step further in analysing directly the interpersonal connections between boards.  It is a 
quantitative application of the approach suggested by Zajac (1988), who emphasised the 
importance of the individual to interlocking board analysis.  The structures of personal 
connectedness created by interlocks are the measure of personal social capital and can be 
understood as a potential communication or opportunity network.  Thus, it is likely that all 
members of those boards that are tied into the large national component of interlocked firms 
constitute a (potential) ‘opportunity network’ (Adams 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). 
 
Social Network Analysis 
 
 Social network analysis (SNA) is the mapping and measuring of structural features or 
patterns of relationships and information flows between people, groups and organisations.  In 
SNA the unit of analysis is not the individual, but an entity consisting of a collection of 
individuals and the linkages among them. 
 
To develop our understanding of the opportunity networks in the Australian and the US 
corporate system, we look at distances, or path lengths, between participants in a network.  
Path length has been the focus of a recent wave of scientific writing about ‘small world’ 
(Barabási 2002; Buchanan 2002; Watts 1999).  Social network theorists originally 
conceptualised the closeness of network participants to one another as the critical feature of 
communication networks, because closeness of participants (or short paths) would optimise 
the efficiency of communication within the network (e.g. see Freeman 1978/79). 
 
Path lengths, distance or degrees of separation are used interchangeably in social network 
theory.  These terms simply mean a count of the number of intermediaries that need to be 
contacted to pass a message between any two persons in a network.  Figure 1 illustrates how 
this concept can be applied to our data on interlocking directorates and highlights the 
differences between traditional approaches to intercorporate network studies and our personal 
network approach.  The figure is based on a simple situation where there are four boards of 
four persons each. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Part A of the diagram represents traditional intercorporate linkages, with each board 
represented as a single participant in a network.  This is the typical intercorporate graph and 
 represents the four companies, showing the interlocking of directors by way of a single solid 
line between each company. 
 
Part B of the diagram illustrates the same situation, except the role of individuals in the 
interlock is explicitly recognised by showing the number of positions (i.e. board 
memberships) involved in the network.  Thus, Part B has sixteen nodes representing all the 
positions in the network (four directors on four boards).  The solid lines in this diagram 
represent the links between people (i.e. the face-to-face contacts between each director and 
each of their three colleagues).  The dotted lines represent joins between positions held by the 
same person.  For example there are two nodes numbered 1, symbolising the same individual 
holds two directorships (one on Company A and one on Company B).  The duplication of 
positions is necessary because the analysis is centred on the directorships of each company 
rather than the individuals who hold those positions.  Thus, despite the recognition of the role 
of individuals in the interlocks, it is still the corporate network that is in focus.   
 
Our analysis focuses on the individual’s role in the intercorporate network and is presented in 
Part C of the diagram.  It shows the personal connections in the network and illustrates the 
path length in the interpersonal, directorship network that cannot be represented in a 
traditional intercorporate graph.  The forced symmetry of four boards of four persons each 
means there are only two sets of persons in the network, the interlockers and the others.  
Interlockers are represented as transparent nodes whereas all other participants are shaded.  
We can see that each interlocker has a circle of six immediate contacts, three each from the 
two boards on which they sit.  They can reach the other five persons in the network in two 
steps, i.e. through one of their immediate contacts.  While it is possible to represent the 
 different companies on this diagram (i.e. the large circles in Part C), this approach clearly 
follows Zajac (1988) in concentrating on personal linkages in the network. 
 
The average path length of all interpersonal connections can be interpreted as an indicator of 
connectivity in a network.  The geodesic path length is defined as the shortest path length 
between two points.  In our example, the average geodesic path length is found by calculating 
the average minimum number of connections it takes for any one director to reach any other 
director.  As discussed earlier, there are only two possible situations in our example for 
directors: they are either interlocking directors with a seat on two boards, or they are not.  An 
interlocking director has an average path length of 1.45.  In contrast, directors who do not 
interlock have an average geodesic path length of 1.91.  These statistics are averaged to give 
us a path length for the network of 1.76.  Detailed calculation of this example is provided in 
the appendix. 
 
An average path length of less than two (as in our example) implies a high level of 
connectivity in a network.  Since path length is a logarithmic variable (Albert & Barabási 
2002), the connectivity of the network falls away very quickly as the average path length 
rises.  Thus, small changes in average or mean path length indicate significant differences in 
the connectivity and connectedness of networks.  
 
While average path length is a global indicator of network connectivity, it cannot be 
interpreted directly, just as it is meaningless to speak of an average family having 2.54 
children.  The distance between individuals involves distinct thresholds; two degrees of 
separation is different from three, is different from four, and so on.  We contend that the 
frequency count of paths at each discrete distance is a better representation of the ‘average’ 
 opportunity structure for networking, because it represents the number of network nodes 
available at each degree.   
 
Since we have argued that board social capital occurs with contacts at distance 1 and 2, we 
contend that the number of contacts at either degree 1 or 2 is a better indicator of a director’s 
social capital than average path length.  In our example, we are arguing that director 11 
would have an opportunity to access 82% of the network (i.e. 3 face-to-face contacts 
representing 27% of the network of individuals and 6 contacts available as contacts of these 
3, representing 55% of the network). 
 
The number of first-degree contacts and second-degree contacts (contacts of contacts) that an 
individual has creates a specific indicator of closeness in the network as a whole.  We regard 
this as an indicator of connectedness of persons in the network as opposed to the connectivity 
of the network measured by mean path length. We can also take the average of this number 
for all individuals in the network.  This percentage will then signal differences in the level of 
connectedness in different networks. 
 
At the individual level however, the more first- and second-degree contacts a director has, the 
greater their centrality in the network.  This will mean they will have a greater access to 
resources such as information and, potentially, greater social capital (Burt 1992).  Since firms 
need resources to achieve their goals, the social capital of a director represents an opportunity 
network within the national corporate governance system for firms to utilise.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Data Sources and Technical Analysis 
 
We used two datasets on the membership of company boards in Australia and the US in 
1996.  The selection method followed the ten nations, Networks of Corporate Power project 
(Stokman, Ziegler & Scott 1985).  The databases contain the top 250 firms for Australia and 
250 for the US selected as the 200 largest non-financial companies, ranked by revenue, and 
the largest 50 financial firms, ranked by assets.  The names of directors were compiled from 
public sources, mainly stock exchange handbooks, and checked against annual reports and 
biographical sources such as Who’s Who in Business in Australia 1996 (Dun & Bradstreet 
Marketing 1996). 
 
Social network analysis was carried out using the social network software, UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 1999).  All board members (including company secretaries and 
alternate directors) were read into UCINET as a two-mode dataset.  The procedure 
‘affiliations’ was used to derive the adjacency matrix of ties between persons.  This 
adjacency matrix was converted to a matrix of geodesic distances between persons to 
highlight whether directors (and their companies) were connected to the main network.8  
Since we were only interested in exploring the social network of the system we eliminated 
persons not connected to the main network.  Statistical routines calculated the number of 
persons at distance 1, 2, etc. and the average distance from each of each person in the 
network to each other person in the network. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Table 1 presents the basic information about the corporate networks of Australia and the 
United States.  It contains information on the populations of corporations, persons and 
positions in each dataset as well as global measures of connectedness in both national 
networks.  Rows 1 and 2 of the table reveal 229 firms, or 91.6% of the original selection were 
networked into the main component of the US corporate network.  In contrast only 198 
companies, or 79.2% of the Australian selection, were networked into the main component.  
The US proportion is very close to the 89.6% for the US network of 1976 reported in the ten 
nation study (Stokman et al. 1985, p. 27), while the Australian proportion is close to the 
average result of countries in that study as at 1976, 77.5%.  This is an interesting finding in 
itself, in that top 250 companies in the US are 15.6% more likely to be part of the corporate 
network than their Australian counterparts. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Row 3 reveals the number of persons involved in the directorship network in the US is almost 
twice as large as that in Australia (2,282 persons compared to 1,163).  This is most likely due 
to the greater number of positions in the US (see row 4), resulting from a larger board size of 
US corporations: 13.2 as opposed to 8.0 in Australia (see row 5).  Despite these differences in 
board and network size, the average number of positions held per person is strikingly similar.  
As row 6 highlights, the average number of directorships held in the Australian network was 
1.36 positions as compared with 1.33 in the US. 
 
Table 1 also shows the incidence of interlocking directorship links in the intercorporate 
network.  These are the interlocks between the networked firms only and do not count 
multiple interlocks between the same pair of firms.  Row 7 highlights the smaller number of 
interlocks for Australia (5.89) compared with the US (8.83).  Despite their being more chance 
 of an interlock on an Australian board (i.e. 73.6% of positions) than in the US (i.e. 66.9% of 
positions) this would indicate that the lower absolute numbers of interlocks on Australian 
boards is due to the smaller size of Australian boards.   
 
In order to interpret the implications of these levels of interlocking, it is useful to compare 
them to thresholds predicted by random graph theory.  The natural log of the number of 
networked companies (row 8) predicts the average number of interlocks we would expect if 
interlocking between companies were random (Bollobás 2001; Scott 2000).  The US network 
passes this test easily (i.e. 8.83 interlocks compared to a threshold prediction of 5.43) and the 
Australian network also passes the threshold, although by a much smaller margin (i.e. 5.89 
interlocks compared with a threshold prediction of 5.29).  
 
Moving to the network of individual directors, the average path length in the US is about one 
half a step shorter than in Australia; the US path is 3.85 while the Australian path length is 
4.34 (row 9).  The average maximum path length highlighted in row 10 (the reach of the 
average participant (Valente & Foreman 1998)), differs by less than one half of a step (6.7 in 
Australia and 6.37 in the US).  It is interesting that despite the US director network being 
almost twice the size of Australia, average distance between participants is significantly 
shorter. 
 
Strong differences appear when we consider the raw numbers of contacts in each system 
provided in rows 11, 13 and 14.  Board members in the US have, on average, 17.8 immediate 
contacts (see row 11).  This is 72.8% more than the 10.3 contacts of Australian board 
members.  This average number of immediate contacts provides the basis to compare the 
density of connections in each country’s director network to the threshold given by random 
 graph theory.  Row 12 provides the natural log of the number of individuals in the personal 
network, and represents the number of direct contacts that we would expect should board 
interlocks be random.  A comparison reveals the Australian network passes this threshold 
more comfortably at the personal as opposed to intercorporate level of analysis.  The US 
network is more than two and a half times the threshold.  Thus, we can conclude that the 
structure of interlocking in the US and Australian systems is not random. 
 
The differences between the two systems compound when we consider the total number of 
persons at distance 1 and 2, provided in rows 13 and 14.  The US figure (148.4) is over twice 
that of Australia’s (63.3).  The average network participant in the US is connected to more 
directors than the average Australian participant.  Even when we consider the numbers of 
directors that are available to be known, a US director is more likely to know his or her 
counterpart than in the smaller Australian network.  The proportion of people that the average 
participant in each system knows is 5.5% in Australia as compared with 6.5% in the US. 
 
Another way to illustrate the significant differences in opportunity networks provided by the 
two systems is to look at the connectedness of the top participants in each system.  Table 2 
presents data on the top 10 network participants in Australia and the US, i.e. the best-
connected people in each network.  The number of positions (or directorships) held by these 
top ten participants is relatively similar.  On average, the top 10 Australian linkers held 4.5 
positions whereas their US counterparts held, on average, 5 positions.   
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Despite this similarity in numbers of directorships held, there are substantial differences in 
individual connectedness.  First, the top 10 Australian linkers could access on average just 
 over 285 people at either degree 1 or 2.  In the US system, the top 10 linkers had, on average, 
access to nearly three times that number of people at degree 1 or 2 (733).  Even accounting 
for the difference in network size, the differences are substantial.  On average, the top 10 
Australian linkers had access to 24.56% of the network at degree 1 or 2.  Their US 
counterparts had access to 32.14% of their substantially larger network. 
 
Finally, we can examine the average path length of the top 10 individuals to illustrate the 
relative closeness of individual directors.  In terms of the whole network, Australia’s top 10 
linkers are, on average, 3.10 degrees of separation away from everyone in the network.  In 
contrast, the top 10 US linkers are only 2.82 degrees away.  As noted earlier, this 0.3 step 
represents significant differences in connectedness, a fact highlighted by the absolute number 
of contacts referred to earlier. 
 
A feature common to both networks is the difference in meaning between centrality in the 
network (based on our measures of closeness and connectedness) and the number of positions 
held.  The significant divergence between positions held and opportunities available 
(represented by persons at degree 1 or 2) highlights that although number of positions held 
will generally correlate with measures of network connectedness, number of directorships 
held is not necessarily a good indicator of an individual’s network position nor an 
individual’s opportunities.  Further, the relatively small differences evident in a purely 
company focused network study (i.e. access to 16% more companies see row 2 table 1) is not 
indicative of the differences in the personal opportunity network (i.e. access to 156% more 
individuals see row 13 table 1) by factor of almost 10.  
 
 DISCUSSION 
 
The study of interlocking directors has been criticised as a method in search of a theory (e.g. 
see Pettigrew 1992).  In this paper we have made a modest contribution towards addressing 
this concern.  By employing the construct of social capital (Lin 2001), we focus on the 
structure of individual director networks as the basis for exploring the resource dependence 
role of the board of directors.  The results are interesting and provide a number of points for 
conjecture and further research. 
 
We started by recognising that interlocking directors have long been thought to facilitate 
access to capital and resources (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996), and affect firm decision-
making (Mizruchi 1996).  Director networks are thought to have significant influence on 
industry structure, firm resources and capabilities, and transaction costs (Heracleous & 
Murray 2001; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer 2000).  Therefore, understanding how interlocking 
directors can assist their firms to gain competitive advantage is best undertaken by examining 
the structure of the network of individual directors (Heracleous & Murray 2001). 
 
By investigating the network of director (as opposed to corporate) interlocks, we highlighted 
that significant differences exist between the corporate networks and the individual director 
networks.  For instance, when normalised for board size differences, we find that the level of 
corporate network activity and reach are roughly similar across the Australian and US 
networks (e.g. there are only 16% more companies connected in the US system than in the 
Australian system).  However, companies do not gain access to resources from other 
companies – people gain access to resources through people.  When viewed in this light, the 
US system provides much more opportunity to its participants.  There are nearly twice as 
 many contacts in the US network than in Australia.  Further, a participant in the US has more 
than twice the network contacts at degrees 1 and 2, and so has access to a greater proportion 
of the larger corporate network.  This is despite the strikingly similar average number of 
board seats held in both countries.  These differences in personal networks may have 
significant implications for comparisons between US and Australian governance systems in 
three key areas.   
 
First, since interlocked firms are likely to have their actions copied (Heracleous & Murray 
2001; Davis & Greve 1997), we would anticipate that a heavily interlocked corporate 
governance network (as represented in our methodology) would support the dispersion of 
corporate innovation and activity because the interlocking directorates (i.e. the individual 
directors) are likely to be conduits for diffusing norms and managerial innovations (Davis 
1991; Fligstein 1985; Johnson et al. 1996; Mizruchi 1989).  Since there is greater social 
network embeddedness in the US system, it is likely that directors in that system are provided 
with superior information and resources.  Future research could compare the dispersion rate 
of corporate activities such as acquisition activity (Haunschild 1993) and anti-takeover 
devices (Davis 1991; Davis & Greve 1997) between the two national networks.  
 
Second, on a more sinister note, actors embedded in a social system are more susceptible to 
social systems pressure (Useem 1984).  Thus, there may be significant negative effects for a 
more densely interlocked governance system (e.g. the proliferation of aggressive accounting 
or adoption of excessive executive remuneration schemes (see Partnoy 2003).  Investigating 
this ‘dark side’ of embeddedness (Gulati & Westphal 1999, p. 501) provides an opportunity 
to understand recent corporate malfeasance and compare the diffusion of these techniques for 
 strongly embedded companies or even comparing the diffusion of practices between 
governance systems. 
 
Third, by examining individual director networks, it may be possible to better understand the 
influence of geographical or spatial factors in the board’s resource dependence role.  While 
previous findings highlight the influence of geography on corporate interlocking (Davis & 
Greve 1997; Kono, Palmer, Friedland & Zafonte 1998), we anticipate that spatial differences 
highlighted thus far should be reflected in differences in personal director networks.  
Therefore, the methodology we have outlined could provide important insights into this area.  
By examining the role of individual directors, it would be possible to highlight their role in 
overcoming or entrenching such spatial differences. 
 
Implications for business agendas  
 
While network structure may affect individual corporations, it is also probable that network 
structure will impact the business agenda of the different corporate governance networks in 
the two countries in different ways.  We know that network structure affects information 
dispersion and agenda framing (Reese, Danielian & Grant 1994).  Also, since actors have a 
psychological need to confirm their work with others (e.g. Crouse 1972; Sigal 1973), it is 
possible that the more connected network of the US system encourages a convergence of 
viewpoints and the setting of a strong, aligned business agenda.  This idea parallels the 
previous discussion on the diffusion of innovation and practices, but instead of focusing 
within the network (i.e. impact on firms) it centres on the impact of firms on the wider 
environment.  For instance, is there likely to be less dissent on important economic and social 
issues voiced by the business community in a more connected network?  What is the role of 
 the tightly connected directors (as opposed to corporations) in any relationship?  How are the 
views of individual directors incorporated into any agenda-setting process? 
 
Implications for board dynamics 
 
Network theory suggests that indirect ties (i.e. second order ties in our analysis) will lead 
directors to attribute characteristics of their contact to the third person (Kilduff & Krackhardt 
1994; Westphal & Milton 2000).  Thus, indirect social ties can enhance confidence in the 
abilities of a third person by association (Granovetter 1973; Krackhardt & Porter 1985; 
Westphal & Milton 2000).  For example, minority directors may increase their influence in 
the boardroom by having network ties to other directors.  These ties enable minority directors 
to create a perception of similarity to the majority by creating a stronger basis for social 
identification (Westphal & Milton 2000).  Thus, the higher degree of personal connectedness 
in the US system may indicate that there is greater likelihood that minority directors have 
influence and are viewed more positively than their Australian counterparts.  It would be 
interesting to investigate if these perceptions are borne out and, further, whether it has led to 
an increased adoption of minority directors in the US system. 
 
Managing environmental complexity 
 
Viewing our findings from a different perspective, the increased interlocking of the US 
system may represent the generally accepted view that more complex organisations require 
more directors to manage interactions with the external environment (Hillman, Cannella & 
Paetzold 2000).  Given the size and complexity disparity between the Australian and US 
networks, we could conclude that directors of the top 250 US companies play a greater role in 
 managing their environment than their Australian counterparts.  This opens an interesting 
area of research as to whether there is an absolute ‘optimal size’ rule for boards and 
interlocks that transcends national boundaries.  Our approach would lend itself well to 
extending Pfeffer’s (1972b) investigation of just such a question, but from the individual 
director perspective.  
 
Alternatively, are the network divergences the result of the structures and processes of board 
appointments and formation in each country?  They may result from the myriad of separate 
decisions that boards make about the number of positions they will create and the type of 
person appointed to fill them.  Another course of investigation lies in investigating these 
decision-making processes. 
 
Limitations and Future Development 
 
The exploratory nature of our proposed measure means that its validity will require testing.  
In particular, the assumption that the presence of a bond (i.e. structural social capital) 
correlates sufficiently with a positive bond (i.e. structural and relational and cognitive social 
capital) requires investigation.  Also, our key proposition that personally focused measures 
are superior to corporate measures requires empirical verification.  This will depend on 
whether resource dependence is due to personal attributes (e.g. obtaining access to separation 
from a director’s network) or the formalisation of a firm-level decision (e.g. becoming a 
director on a joint-venture board).  If we are incorrect, our proposed measure may overstate 
the opportunity network compared to a firm-level measure. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The comparison of US and Australian corporate opportunity networks raises three interesting 
points.  First, large networks (such as in the US) provide more connectedness for participants 
than smaller counterparts (such as in Australia).  If these differential opportunities are utilised 
by participants to the same extent, we would expect a number of potentially important 
implications.  For instance, the larger the network, the greater access to resources for a firm.  
Similarly, innovation and information should diffuse more rapidly through a larger network 
and we would expect that any information asymmetry or innovation advantages would not 
last as long in a larger network.  
 
Second, despite directors in both systems holding, on average, similar numbers of positions, 
the US director has a much greater potential network in which to build and exploit social 
capital.  This is the case in percentage and absolute terms.  Do directors in the US see this as 
an advantage, or do they envy the simpler lives of their counterparts in countries such as 
Australia?  What drives discussion and decision making about board size in each system?   
 
Third, there is the question about the relationship between networking and opportunity 
structure.  Is it the case that the perception of collective opportunity drives and legitimates 
higher levels of interlocking in the US or is it an accidental by-product of historically 
embedded practices of board appointment?  Conversely, is the historical practice of smaller 
boards in Australia a constraint that is overcome by the higher number of positions held per 
person?  
 
 We propose that a significant part of the social capital of a board comes through the person-
to-person contacts that board members make with members of other boards.  These contacts 
create an interpersonal network among board members.  We also argue that the interpersonal 
network arises as a consequence of interlocks between firms.  Once these links are dense 
enough to create a large, central national network, directors are brought into a single, 
connected communication network of significant breadth and scale.  This is a resource for 
building the social capital of individual directors and enhancing the social capital of boards.  
This, in turn, may have implications for board, firm and system performance. 
 
Future research on board social capital, particularly structural analysis of directorship 
networks, can profit from our approach and techniques.  We suggest that it is important to 
understand the relationship between density and centralisation that we have not been able to 
investigate in this paper.  This relationship will be tied to the dual nature of board networks.  
There is also a need for research on the manner and degree to which members of boards 
access and utilise the resource offered by networks.  Although requiring a different mode of 
enquiry, research of this kind is also needed to complement the formal analysis used in this 
paper and to concentrate more on the effect of an individual board or director’s position 
within the opportunity network itself. 
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 APPENDIX ONE – CALCULATION OF GEODESIC PATH LENGTH 
 
In the hypothetical example provided (diagram two), directors: they are either interlocking 
directors with a seat on two boards, or they are not.  An interlocking director can reach 6 
contacts with a path length of 1, and the other 5 contacts with a path length of 2.  Thus the 
average path length for an interlocker is ((6*1)+(5*2))/11= 1.45.   
 
In contrast, directors who do not interlock can reach 3 contacts with a path length of 1 (e.g. 
Director 11 has face-to-face contact with directors 10, 12 and 3).  The director then has 
contact with another 6 directors with a path length of 2 (in our example, directors 7, 8 and 9 
become second degree contacts through director 10 and directors 1, 2 and 4 become second 
degree contacts through director 3).  Finally, 2 directors require a path length of three for the 
non-interlocking director to connect (in our example directors 5 and 6 require a path length of 
3 because no director is common to companies B and D).  Thus, non-interlocking directors 
have an average geodesic path length of ((3*1)+(6*2)+(2*3))/11= 1.91.   
 
In order to calculate the mean path length for the network (as opposed to individual 
directors), we need to average these statistics.  Since we have four interlockers and eight non-
interlocking directors, the mean path length for the network is (4*1.45+8*1.91)/12= 1.76.   
 TABLE 1: THE POPULATION, DEMOGRAPHY AND GLOBAL INDICATORS OF 
CONNECTEDNESS IN DIRECTORSHIP NETWORKS:  AUSTRALIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES, 1996 
 
Row Statistic Australia 
United 
States 
1 Number of companies in population 250 250 
2 Number of companies in network component 198 229 
3 Number of persons on boards of networked corporation 1,163 2,282 
4 Number of positions on boards of networked corporation 1,583 3,042 
5 Average positions per board 8.0 13.2 
6 Average positions per person 1.36 1.33 
7 Interlocks per networked corporation (multiple ties excluded) 5.89 8.83 
8 Natural log of the number of networked corporations 5.29 5.43 
9 Average path length (networked companies only) 4.34 3.85 
10 Average maximum path length 6.70 6.37 
11 Average number of persons at degree 1 10.3 17.8 
12 Natural log of number of persons in the network 7.06 7.73 
13 Average number of persons at degree 1 and degree 2 63.3 148.4 
14 Persons at degree 1 and 2 as a % of all persons in the network 5.5% 6.5% 
 
 TABLE 2: TOP 10 NETWORK PARTICIPANTS RANKED BY NUMBER OF FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREE CONTACTS: AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
1996 
 
Number of 
positions held 
Number of 
persons at 
distance 1 and 2 
Proportion of 
persons at 
distance 1 and 2 
Mean geodesic 
distance 
Individual 
Connectedness 
Ranking Australia US Australia US Australia US Australia US 
1 4 7 311 874 26.76 38.32 3.00 2.73 
2 5 6 307 835 26.42 36.61 3.10 2.76 
3 6 6 294 813 25.30 35.64 3.07 2.78 
4 6 5 287 754 24.70 33.06 3.08 2.78 
5 5 5 286 722 24.61 31.65 3.13 2.82 
6 4 4 285 711 24.53 31.17 3.07 2.86 
7 4 5 284 672 24.44 29.46 3.14 2.84 
8 3 4 270 671 23.24 29.42 3.19 2.83 
9 4 4 267 643 22.98 28.19 3.12 2.92 
10 4 4 263 635 22.63 27.84 3.13 2.90 
Average 4.50 5.00 285.40 733.00 24.56 32.14 3.10 2.82 
 
 FIGURE 1: THE INTERCORPORATE NETWORK 
PART A
PART B
PART C
POSITIONS/DIRECTORSHIPS 
IN THE CORPORATE 
NETWORK
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PERSONAL NETWORK
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Legend:           Interlocker 
Non-interlocker  
Notes:  1. Companies are represented by letters
2. People are represented by numbers
  
                                                 
1 Interlocks have been used to study research topics beyond resource dependence theory.  For example, linkages 
have been employed to examine issues of class hegemony whereby boards are seen as a ‘means of perpetuating 
the powers of the ruling capitalist elite’ (Zahra & Pearce 1989: 299) and financial hegemony (Mintz & Schwartz 
1981). 
2 Study of interlocks has been extended to the study of indirect interlocks (Burt 1980b).  An indirect interlock 
occurs where directors of firms A and B have a chance to communicate decisions made by their firms through 
creating an interlock with another firm, particularly financial institutions.  Although there is little existing 
systemic evidence of this arrangement, case studies provide individual evidence of the use of financial 
intermediaries in cooptation.  For example, Patman (1968) reports case study material that documents some 
firms using financial institutions as intermediaries in coopting resources.   
3 This negative correlation has been interpreted as a need for cooptation by non-family companies (Burt 1980b) 
and has been interpreted as the board performing a representation rather than an internal control function (Zald 
1969). 
4 An important implication of this study is that board size and interlocks cannot be used interchangeably 
5 Studies of broken ties essentially argue that if an interlock is important, it will be reconstituted if accidentally 
broken (Mizruchi & Stearns 1988). 
6 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identify another key role as providing specific resources from experience (i.e. 
advice), a view that has been empirically examined by looking at the relationship between interlocks and 
strategy development (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996; Geletkanycz & Hambrick 1997). 
7 We are indebted to the editor for alerting us to this key point. 
8 A network typically contains a main component and several other networks that are not linked to the main 
component. 
 
